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ABSTRACT
This paper examines whether CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond
their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry
and market shocks to firm performance when deciding on CEO retention. Using a new hand-
collected  sample  of  1,590  CEO  turnovers  from  1993  to  2001,  we  document  that  CEOs  are
significantly  more  likely  to  be  dismissed  from  their  jobs  after  bad  industry  and  bad  market
performance. A decline in the industry component of firm performance from its 75th to its 25th
percentile increases the probability of a forced CEO turnover by approximately 50 percent. This
finding is robust to controls for firm-specific performance. The result is at odds with the prior
empirical literature which showed that corporate boards filter exogenous shocks from CEO dismissal
decisions in samples from the 1970s and 1980s. Our findings suggest that the standard CEO turnover
model is too simple to capture the empirical relation  between performance and forced CEO
turnovers, and we evaluate several extensions to the standard model.
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The decision whether to retain or fire an incumbent CEO after bad stock price or accounting 
performance  is  one  of  the  most  important  decisions  made  by  corporate  boards.  Standard 
economic theory suggests that in assessing the quality of its CEO the board of directors should 
ignore components of firm performance which are caused by factors beyond the CEO’s control. 
Previous  studies  that  have  examined  the  relation  between  (arguably  exogenous)  market  or 
industry shocks and CEO turnover have found evidence largely consistent with this hypothesis. 
Using a larger data set of CEO dismissals over a more recent time period and an improved 
methodology, we find to the contrary that CEOs are significantly more likely to be fired after 
negative performance shocks to their peer group.  
 
In a newly assembled data set of 1,206 voluntary and 384 forced CEO turnovers in 2,548 firms 
from  1993  to  2001,  we  document  that  low  industry  stock  returns  and  low  market  returns 
significantly  increase  the  likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnovers.  A  decline  in  the  industry 
component of firm performance from its 75
th to its 25
th percentile increases the probability of a 
forced CEO turnover by approximately 50 percent. There is some evidence that boards partially 
filter industry and market performance from their assessment of CEO quality, but the extent of 
this filtering is too limited to remove most of the peer performance effect. We conclude that 
boards  fail  to  fully  filter  exogenous  shocks  to  firm  performance  from  their  CEO  retention 
decisions. 
 
We document more effective filtering of more visible indicators of outside performance, such as 
the performance of the value-weighted market index, suggesting that boards may use some rule-
of-thumb relative performance evaluation when assessing CEO quality. We also find that the 
effect of peer group performance on CEO dismissals is almost entirely concentrated on CEOs 
who underperform their peer group. CEOs who outperform their peer group are not affected by 
worsening industry or market performance. Finally, we document that firm-specific performance 
affects CEO dismissals most strongly when the peer group is not doing well. The evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that performance in recessions is more informative about CEO 
quality than performance in booms, and with the hypothesis that boards mistakenly credit or 
blame CEOs for performance caused by factors beyond their control. 
   3 
Our empirical results contrast with the small prior literature on the relationship between peer 
group performance and CEO turnover. Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) examine CEO turnover 
from 1963 to 1978 and find that stock returns relative to the overall market are a better predictor 
of  CEO  dismissals  than  absolute  performance.  The  results  involving  lagged  returns  are 
ambiguous, and they find no evidence that industry shocks are filtered from the CEO dismissal 
decision. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) examine turnovers of entire top management teams 
between 1980 and 1985 and find such turnovers equally likely to occur in troubled and in healthy 
industries, suggesting that industry shocks are filtered from the dismissal decision. Barro and 
Barro (1990) find evidence similarly consistent with complete filtering of peer performance in a 
sample of CEO turnovers in commercial banks from 1982 to 1987. All three studies are based on 
small samples, with 43 forced CEO turnovers in Warner et al., 93 cases of internally precipitated 
turnover in Morck et al., and 51 bank CEO turnovers in Barro and Barro. Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990), on the other hand, examine a large sample of 1,000 CEO successions over the 1974 to 
1986 period and find strong evidence that both market-wide shocks and industry shocks are 
filtered from stock price performance for the CEO dismissal decision. In summary, most of the 
evidence from previous studies supports the hypothesis that corporate boards filter industry and 
market shocks from firm performance when deciding whether to fire their CEO.
1  
 
Agency theory shows that there are benefits associated with evaluating agents on the basis of 
their  relative  performances  whenever  agents’  performances  are  affected  by  common  shocks 
(Holmström (1979, 1982), Diamond and Verrechia (1982)). Most of the theoretical literature 
modeling the CEO dismissal decision envisions a situation in which the corporate board learns 
from firm performance and other public and private signals about the quality of its current CEO.
2 
If the board’s assessment of CEO quality falls below some threshold, often equal to the expected 
quality of a replacement manager, then the board dismisses the CEO. Since CEO quality does 
not change as a function of the business cycle in these models, it follows directly that efficient 
boards do not force out more CEOs in down markets than in up markets. More generally, boards 
                                                 
1 Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), and Gibbons and Murphy (1990) do not 
formally test whether market or industry returns are completely filtered from firm performance for the management 
dismissal decisions. Barro and Barro (1990) do perform a formal test and find results consistent with complete 
filtering, with the caveat that their test imposes the assumption that firms have a stock return beta of one with respect 
to the benchmark return. 
2 See, for example, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994, 1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003), Warther (1998), 
Goldman, Hazarika, and Shivdasani (2003), Adams and Ferreira (2005), and Hermalin (2005).   4 
should  filter  all  observable  exogenous  shocks  from  firm  performance  when  updating  their 
assessment of CEO quality. This prediction is strongly rejected by the empirical results we find, 
and we conclude that the simple framework used in much of the literature does not fully explain 
real-world CEO dismissal decisions.  
 
We discuss several extensions and modifications to the basic CEO turnover model which might 
explain  our  empirical  results.  There  is  a  large  literature  aimed  at  understanding  the  well-
documented absence of relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation.
3 We first note 
that most of the explanations offered by this literature do not apply in the CEO turnover context.
4 
We propose instead that the negative relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and 
peer  group  performance  could  be  caused  (i)  by  CEOs’  actions  and  skills  affecting  industry 
performance  through  strategic  interactions  in  oligopolistic  industries,  (ii)  by  CEOs  being 
dismissed for moving their firms into the wrong industries, (iii) by performance in recessions 
being more informative about CEO quality than performance in booms, (iv) by shareholders or 
boards who incorrectly blame the CEO for negative performance shocks beyond her control, and 
(v) by shareholders or boards whose limited attention is triggered by low absolute levels of 
performance.  
  
We analyze the relation between peer group performance and forced CEO turnover in detail to 
assess which of the five hypotheses above are more likely to explain the empirical results. We 
find that the effect of industry performance on CEO turnover persists as we broaden the industry 
definition and as we restrict the sample to small firms. Since large industries are unlikely to be 
oligopolistic, and since small firms are unlikely to affect the product market equilibrium in their 
industries,  these  results  speak  against  the  hypothesis  that  our  findings  are  driven  by  CEOs 
operating in oligopolistic settings. We show next that the effect of industry performance on CEO 
turnovers  persists  when  we  benchmark  firm  performance  against  industry  competitors  from 
several years ago, which speaks against the hypothesis that our findings are driven by CEOs 
being punished for moving their firms into the wrong industries. To test the hypothesis that 
                                                 
3 For the empirical evidence see, among others, Murphy (1985), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Antle and Smith 
(1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Janakiraman et al. (1992), Garen (1994), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), 
Murphy (1999), and the review in Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2001).  
4 See the detailed discussion in Section I.C.   5 
performance in recessions may be more informative about CEO quality than performance in 
booms, we interact firm-specific performance with indicators for low, medium, and high industry 
performance in the CEO turnover regressions. We find mostly confirmatory evidence showing 
that  CEO  turnover  is  indeed  more  sensitive  to  firm-specific  performance  when  industry 
performance is low, but the result does not obtain in all specifications.  
 
We test the hypothesis that boards mistakenly blame CEOs for exogenous performance shocks 
by noting that such mistakes should affect underperforming CEOs more strongly than CEOs who 
outperform  their  peer  group.  Even  with  systematic  attribution  errors,  outperforming  CEOs 
should only rarely be dismissed; they can always point out to their board that competitors are 
performing worse and induce the board to use relative performance evaluation. Underperforming 
CEOs, on the other hand, are more likely to be affected by attribution errors. Given that their 
performance is trailing the peer  group, they are less able to mount a strong defense  against 
incorrect performance attribution in recessions, but will be happy to hide behind good industry 
and  market  performance  in  booms.  The  empirical  results  strongly  support  the  predicted 
asymmetry: the documented effect of peer performance on CEO turnover is shown to be almost 
entirely  restricted  to  underperforming  CEOs.  This  is  consistent  with  boards  committing 
attribution errors and failing to use relative performance evaluation unless prodded by the CEO. 
 
Finally, we directly test the hypothesis that our results are caused by shareholders whose limited 
attention is triggered by low levels of performance. Under this hypothesis, efficient filtering of 
peer  performance  from  the  CEO  dismissal  decision  should  obtain  after  low  absolute  returns 
because investors have woken up and correctly assess CEO performance. It follows that the 
relative performance evaluation hypothesis should be confirmed for firms with very low levels of 
prior performance. Instead, we find that the effect of peer group performance on CEO turnover 
persists among firms with large negative prior returns. Furthermore, the relative performance 
evaluation hypothesis is also rejected for large and high-profile firms which are likely to be 
continuously  monitored  by  the  press  and  institutional  investors.  We  conclude  that  limited 
investor attention is unlikely to be the main cause of the failure of the relative performance 
evaluation hypothesis. 
   6 
While  far  from  conclusive,  the  results  of  our  tests  are  broadly  consistent  with  the  idea  that 
performance in recessions is more revealing about CEO quality than performance in booms, and 
with the idea that boards mistakenly credit or blame CEOs for performance components beyond 
their  control.  We  also  find  that  boards  tend  to  filter  the  performance  of  the  value-weighted 
market and of the largest firms in the industry from firm performance when deciding on CEO 
retention. This suggests that boards may use some form of intuitive rule-of-thumb benchmarking 
against  the  most  visible  benchmarks,  while  failing  to  properly  account  for  other  exogenous 
performance components.
5 For further suggestive evidence on whether the observed turnover 
patterns are optimal or the symptom of a behavioral inefficiency, we examine the stock price 
reactions to CEO turnover announcements in our sample. We find no evidence of different stock 
price reactions in recessions compared to booms, and conclude that the market does not view the 
more  frequent  CEO  dismissals  in  recessions  as  better  or  worse  news  than  the  less  frequent 
dismissals in booms.  
 
Independently  of  the  underlying  mechanism,  the  documented  effect  of  industry  and  market 
performance  on  CEO  turnover  has  interesting  implications  for  our  understanding  of  CEO 
incentives and horizons. Our findings are also important for the correct design of CEO turnover 
studies.  The  prior  literature  customarily  assumes  that  CEOs  are  evaluated  based  on  relative 
performance, and therefore regresses turnover on market- or industry-adjusted stock returns only. 
Given  our  evidence  that  CEO  dismissals  are  in  fact  determined  by  both  firm-specific 
performance and by industry and market performance, the regressions using only peer-adjusted 
performance suffer from omitted variable bias. It follows that future studies should include both 
firm-specific and peer group performance as explanatory variables.
6 An interesting question for 
future research is how the effect of peer group performance on CEO turnover we identify in this 
                                                 
5 Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf (2005) propose a model in which shareholders misattribute firm-specific 
performance to the CEO rather than circumstance, and in which the board needs to decide whether to give in to 
shareholder demands to fire the CEO. Our results are consistent with the basic idea in Fisman et al., but suggest that 
shareholders may misattribute peer group performance to the CEO. 
6 A further frequent cause of misspecification is the implicit assumption that firm performance moves one-to-one 
with  market  or  industry  performance.  Prior  studies  simply  subtract  index  performance  from  firm  performance, 
effectively imposing a beta of one on all firms. This assumption is often incorrect, as the sample betas in Panel A of 
Tables 2 and 5 demonstrate. The problem is more severe when industry and firm performance are measured using 
return-on-assets. In unreported results we found that the average firm in our sample has a return-on-assets beta of 
below 0.3 with its equal-weighted industry benchmark and a beta of below 0.15 with its value-weighted industry 
benchmark. Assuming a beta of one in these cases leads to severely biased inferences.   7 
paper varies cross-sectionally with the determinants of the turnover-performance relationship 
documented in the prior literature.
7 
 
The next section reviews the theory behind relative performance evaluation in the CEO turnover 
context  and  derives  the  central  testable  hypothesis.  Section  I.B  develops  the  empirical 
specification. Section I.C discusses a number of reasons why relative performance evaluation 
may not obtain in the CEO turnover context. Section II describes the construction of the CEO 
turnover  sample,  and  Section  III  presents  the  main  results  on  the  effect  of  peer  group 
performance  on  forced  CEO  turnover.  Section  IV  examines  the  relationship  between  CEO 
dismissals and peer performance in more detail in an attempt to distinguish between different 
explanations for the observed regularities. The final section summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
I. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
This  section  starts  with  an  informal  review  of  relative  performance  evaluation  in  the  CEO 
turnover context. We use a simple model in which the board learns about CEO ability from firm 
performance to demonstrate that the optimal likelihood of CEO dismissals should be unrelated to 
industry and market performance. Section I.B restates this testable hypothesis in an instrumental 
variables (IV) framework in which market and industry performance act as instruments for firm 
performance. This reformulation forms the basis of the subsequent empirical analysis. Stating the 
relative  performance  evaluation  hypothesis  in  an  IV  framework  helps  to  illustrate  the 
circumstances under which the hypothesis is likely to fail empirically. On this basis, Section I.C 
discusses several reasons why relative performance evaluation may not be observed in the CEO 
turnover context.  
 
A. Relative performance evaluation and CEO turnover  
The  simple  CEO  turnover  model  sketched  in  this  section  is  not  meant  to  be  an  accurate 
description of the realities of CEO retention decisions, but illustrates the logic behind relative 
performance  evaluation  and  delivers  the  central  empirical  predictions.  Deviations  from  the 
                                                 
7 The effect of firm performance on the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers has been shown to vary, among other 
factors, with CEO stock ownership (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980, Denis et al., 1997), the presence of a blockholder 
(Denis  et  al.  1997),  the  composition  of  the  board  (Weisbach,  1988),  and  the  availability  of  suitable  outside 
candidates (Parrino, 1997).   8 
simplifying assumptions of the model may render (complete) relative performance evaluation 
inefficient, as we discuss in Section I.C below. The derivation in this section relies heavily on 
Holmström (1982) and Gibbons and Murphy (1990).  
 
Formally, let CEO i’s ability be given by  i α  and the performance of firm i by  i y : 
(1)  η ε α + + = i i i y  
Here  i ε   is  an  idiosyncratic  noise  term  affecting  firm i  only,  and η  is  an  unobserved  shock 
common to all firms, of which there are n in the reference group. The board cannot observe CEO 
ability  and  tries  to  learn  it  from  observed  firm  performance.  The  board  believes  that  i α   is 
normally  distributed  with  mean  zero  and  variance 
2
α σ .  Suppose  further  that  i ε   and  η  are 
normally distributed with mean zero and variances 
2
ε σ  and 
2
η σ , respectively. The common shock 
and the n CEOs’ individual abilities and idiosyncratic shocks are independent.  
 
The board of directors of firm i observes the performance of firm i and the performance of the n-
1 other firms in the reference group. Given the distributional assumptions made, the board uses 
the  standard  formula  for  the  conditional  expectation  of  a  multivariate  normal  variable  to 
calculate the optimal estimate of CEO ability: 
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The estimate of CEO i’s ability is positively related to the performance of firm i, and negatively 
to the average performance of the firms in the reference group. The crucial insight is that the 
optimal estimate of CEO ability in (2) completely purges the (noisily estimated) common shock 
from  firm  performance.  To  see  this,  note  that  the  term  in  brackets  is  the  residual  from  a 
population  regression  of  firm  i’s  performance  on  the  performance  of  all  other  firms  in  the 
industry: 
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The  performance  residual  i v ~   in  (3)  is  the  purely  firm-specific  component  of  firm  i’s  total 
performance. Combining (2) and (3), the optimal estimate of CEO i’s ability can be rewritten as 
a function of this idiosyncratic performance component only: 
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Here k is a constant given by the first term in (2) above. It follows directly that the optimal 
estimate of CEO i’s ability is uncorrelated with the average performance of the reference group. 
Said differently, the performance of the peer group has no predictive power for the ex-post 
assessment of CEO i’s ability. Good peer group performance does not make it any more or less 
likely that any individual CEO is assessed as having high or low ability than does bad peer group 
performance. Formally, 
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In standard models of CEO turnover, CEOs are dismissed when the board’s optimal estimate of 
CEO ability falls below some threshold α , which may be the expected ability of a replacement 
CEO.
8 Because the board completely filters the common shock from its assessment of CEO 
ability, it follows from (5) and the distributional assumptions made that the incidence of forced 
CEO turnover is uncorrelated with peer group performance: 
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Here I[.] is an indicator function that takes a value of one if the optimal estimate of CEO ability 
falls below the threshold level α . Equation (6) states that forced CEO turnover is uncorrelated 
with the performance of the reference group, and is the central testable implication of the simple 
theory of relative performance evaluation presented here. Assessing CEO competence in this 
model is a standard signal extraction problem, and imperfect performance filtering would imply 
inefficient inferences about CEO ability, and ultimately inefficient CEO dismissal decisions. 
 
                                                 
8 The ability threshold below which the current CEO is dismissed has to be adjusted for any costs of firing the CEO 
and  for  any  costs  of  finding  a  suitable  replacement.  See,  for  example,  Hirshleifer  and  Thakor  (1994,  1998), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003), Warther (1998), Goldman et al. (2003), Adams and Ferreira (2005), and 
Hermalin (2005).   10 
B. The empirical strategy  
The main implication of the relative performance evaluation model presented in the previous 
section is that the agent is evaluated on the unsystematic component of her firm’s performance 
only. Whether the reference group is booming or in a recession contains no information about 
CEO  quality  and  has  no  predictive  power  for  the  likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnovers.  The 
prediction that peer group performance is completely filtered from the evaluation of the CEO has 
been termed the strong-form relative performance evaluation hypothesis in the prior literature.
9 
The empirical strategy developed in this section to test for strong-form relative performance 
evaluation in CEO turnovers borrows heavily from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Wolfers 
(2002), and Garvey and Milbourn (2004).  
 
We estimate the sensitivity of CEO turnover to common performance factors using a two-stage 
regression approach: The first stage regression decomposes firm performance into a systematic 
component caused by peer group performance and a firm-specific component that should, in 
part,  reflect  CEO  ability.  In  the  second  stage,  we  predict  the  probability  of  a  forced  CEO 
turnover  using  the  peer  group  component  and  the  residual  component  of  firm  performance 
estimated in the first stage.
10 This two-stage procedure is effectively an instrumental variables 
estimation, with peer group performance serving as an instrument for firm performance: 
 
(7)   (i)  1 , 1 ,   1 0 1 , − − − + ⋅ + = t i t group peer t i r r ν β β  
  (ii) Probability(CEO dismissali,t)  =  ( ) t i t i t group peer r , 1 , 2 1 ,   1 0 1 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ς ν γ β β γ γ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + − −  
    =  t i t i t i r , 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ˆ ˆ ς ν γ γ γ + ⋅ + ⋅ + − −  
 
Here  1 , ˆ − t i r  is the estimated exogenous component of firm performance common to the peer group 
and not attributable to CEO actions or CEO quality, and  1 , ˆ − t i ν  is the estimated firm-specific 
performance component. The prediction of strong-form relative performance evaluation is that 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Janakiraman et al. (1992) and Albuquerque (2005). We discuss the corresponding weak-form 
relative performance evaluation hypothesis below. 
10 Many variables other than firm and peer group performance affect the probability of a forced CEO turnover, with 
CEO tenure and board composition as obvious examples. Since none of these other determinants are likely to be 
correlated with peer group performance, they do not affect our test of relative performance evaluation.        11 
the exogenous performance component does not affect CEO turnover, and hence  0 1 = γ . The 
interpretation of the  2 γ coefficient on firm-specific performance is more subtle since the residual 
variation in firm performance reflects in part CEO skill and in part unobserved shocks not related 
to industry or market performance.
11 Since firm-specific performance is partly driven by CEO 
skill, we expect that firm-specific performance is negatively related to the likelihood of CEO 
dismissal ( 0 2 < γ ).
12  
 
An  important  choice  in  the  empirical  design  is  whether  to  allow  the  sensitivity  of  firm 
performance to peer performance to differ across firms. Estimating firm-specific betas introduces 
estimation error into the peer performance term in the second stage regression, with two possible 
consequences: If the estimation error is simply noise, then the coefficient on peer performance in 
the CEO turnover regression is biased towards zero, making us more likely to accept the relative 
performance  evaluation  hypothesis.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  estimation  error  introduces 
elements of firm-specific performance into the estimated peer performance term, then we may 
erroneously reject the relative performance evaluation hypothesis.
13 To avoid these problems, 
and to be consistent with the related literature, we estimate a common peer performance beta for 
all firms in the first stage regression. As a robustness check we repeat the estimations with firm-
specific betas and obtain similar results. 
 
                                                 
11 In Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2001) analysis of relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation the firm-
specific performance residual is dropped from the second stage regression and a standard IV regression estimated. 
Wolfers (2002), on the other hand, includes the corresponding state-specific performance residual in his analysis of 
relative performance evaluation in gubernatorial election outcomes. In the linear regressions used in both papers, the 
inclusion  or  exclusion  of  the  first  stage  residual  has  no  effect  on  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  peer  group 
component of performance: the residual is by construction uncorrelated with peer group performance and there is no 
omitted variable bias. In the binary choice models we use in our second stage regressions, the coefficient on peer 
group performance would be biased even if the omitted variable were uncorrelated with peer performance (Yatchew 
and Griliches (1985), Wooldridge (2002)), and  we  need  to include the  first  stage residual in  the second stage 
regressions.  
12 The difficulty in fully separating performance variation due to CEO skill from performance variation due to good 
or bad luck unrelated to industry or market shocks means that the estimated effect of firm-specific performance on 
CEO dismissals is a mix of the effect of skill and the effect of luck. Assuming that the true effect of luck does not 
exceed the true effect of skill, the coefficient on firm-specific performance is a downward biased estimate of the 
actual effect of CEO skill on forced CEO turnover.  
13 We have simulated the two-stage estimation using actual firm stock returns and randomly generated peer group 
returns. The peer group returns are by construction unrelated to firm returns, which is reflected in average firm-
specific betas close to zero in the first stage regressions. Using these firm-specific betas, we are able to erroneously 
reject the relative performance evaluation hypothesis at high levels of significance in the CEO turnover regressions 
if the firm-specific betas are estimated with too few data points.   12 
The instrumental variables set-up clarifies the conditions under which we expect the predictions 
of strong-form relative performance evaluation to obtain in the data. The tests treat peer group 
performance as a plausibly exogenous instrument for the “luck” that has aided or hampered the 
CEO’s running of the firm. For peer group performance to be a valid instrument it is required 
that (i) the instrument is exogenous and that (ii) the instrument does not have a direct effect on 
CEO  dismissals  independent  from  firm  performance.  Violations  of  these  two  assumptions 
correspond directly to the arguments against relative performance evaluation in CEO turnover 
which  we  discuss  in  the  next  section.  Briefly,  the  exogeneity  assumption  could  be  violated 
because CEO skill or actions affect peer group performance, as may be the case in oligopolistic 
settings.  The  second  assumption  could  be  violated  if  times  of  high  (or  low)  peer  group 
performance were times in which boards receive more (or less) informative signals about their 
CEOs. For  example, an industry downturn may test certain aspects of  CEO skill which are 
otherwise unobservable by the board.  
 
The two-stage regression approach in (7) above is not used by the prior literature which does not 
test for strong-form relative performance evaluation in CEO turnover. Prior studies instead test 
the so-called weak-form implication of the theory: the likelihood of CEO dismissals should be 
negatively related to firm performance, and positively to the performance of the reference group. 
Unlike strong-form relative performance evaluation, this weak-form hypothesis does not predict 
complete filtering of exogenous peer-group performance, and instead predicts only that some 
performance  filtering  is  used  by  corporate  boards.  Following,  among  others,  Gibbons  and 
Murphy  (1990)  and  Barro  and  Barro  (1990),  we  test  for  weak-form  relative  performance 
evaluation using the following regression model: 
 
(8)   Probability(CEO dismissalt) =  t i t i t group peer r r , 1 , 2 1 ,   1 0 ' ' ' ν γ γ γ + ⋅ + ⋅ + − −  
 
Weak-form relative performance evaluation predicts that CEO dismissals are negatively related 
to firm performance ( 0 '2 < γ ), holding peer performance constant, and positively related to peer 
performance ( 0 '1 > γ ), holding firm performance constant. Including both firm and peer group 
performance  in  the  same  single-stage  regression  produces  coefficients  which  are  hard  to   13 
interpret.  The  estimated  1 ' γ   coefficient  on  peer  performance  is  the  product  of  the  peer 
performance  coefficient  from  the  second  stage  regression  7(ii)  and  the  sensitivity  of  firm 
performance  to  peer  performance  from  the  first  stage  regression  7(i)  described  above 
( 1 1 1 ' β γ γ ⋅ = ). Hence the estimated coefficient can be small either because there is no effect of 
peer group performance on CEO dismissals, or because firm performance is not sensitive to peer 
performance. The two-stage IV procedure circumvents this problem by effectively scaling the 
effect of “luck” on firm performance.
14  
 
C. Reasons for the absence of full relative performance evaluation in forced CEO turnover 
The previous sections have made the case for relative performance evaluation in CEO retention 
decisions. In this section we discuss several reasons why peer group performance may not be, or 
at least not be fully, filtered from firm performance when boards decide whether to dismiss their 
CEOs. We review five hypotheses which posit that the simple agency model used to develop the 
relative  performance  evaluation  predictions  is  not  descriptively  valid  for  CEOs,  and  which 
instead predict that peer performance should affect the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. The 
first three hypotheses interpret a peer performance effect on CEO dismissals as an efficient 
contracting outcome, while the last two hypotheses describe it as a behavioral inefficiency. 
 
Hypothesis 1: CEOs in oligopolistic industries interact strategically  
Linking CEO retention decisions to rival firm performance may serve shareholders by softening 
competition in industries subject to oligopolistic competition. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) 
model  optimal  CEO  compensation  contracts  in  an  environment  with  strategic  interactions 
between imperfectly competitive firms.
15 They show that the optimal compensation contract may 
put positive weight on both own-firm and rival-firm performance, in contrast to the standard 
relative performance evaluation predictions. In the CEO turnover context, boards may dismiss 
                                                 
14 Some papers in the CEO compensation literature incorrectly test for strong-form relative performance evaluation 
by testing the restriction that  1 ' γ  and  2 ' γ  are of opposite sign and equal magnitude  ) 0 ' ' ( 2 1 = +γ γ  in equation (8). 
The correct test for strong-form relative performance evaluation using equation (8) instead corresponds to testing a 
non-linear constraint of the form  1 2 1 ' / ' β γ γ − = , where  1 β  is the sensitivity of firm performance with respect to 
industry performance from equation (7(i)). See Janakiraman, Lambert, and Larcker (1992) for a paper implementing 
the correct test in the CEO compensation context.  
15 The optimal incentive contracts for managers in oligopolistic settings have been previously analyzed by Sklivas 
(1987) and Fershtman and Judd (1987).   14 
CEOs for low industry performance if such performance is caused by CEO actions, for example 
because the CEO started a price war with competitors. We evaluate this hypothesis empirically 
in Section IV.A by testing whether the effect of industry performance on CEO turnover vanishes 
as the industry definition broadens (as broader industries are less likely to be oligopolistic) and 
whether the effect is weaker for small firms (which are less likely to affect the product market 
equilibrium in their industry).  
 
Hypothesis 2: CEOs are fired for choosing the wrong industry 
Optimal CEO evaluations may not filter peer group performance out because CEOs have at least 
some control over the peer group among which their firm operates. Dye (1992) has argued that 
relative  performance  evaluation  motivates  executives  to  invest  in  industries  where  they  can 
outperform their competitors, rather than in industries that offer the highest absolute returns. The 
problem described by Dye can be solved by selecting the peer group benchmark for each CEO 
before  any  industry  relocation  choices  are  made.  Practically  speaking,  firms  should  be 
benchmarked against their direct competitors from several years ago. Such a benchmark provides 
the CEO with efficient incentives: moving her firm into the industry with the highest expected 
returns allows her to outperform the competitors from her prior industry. We incorporate the Dye 
hypothesis into our empirical tests in Section IV.B by lagging industry affiliation by five years. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Performance in recessions reveals more about CEO quality than performance in 
booms 
Industry or market-wide recessions may allow boards to learn more about the quality of their 
CEO than booms, for example because recessions test aspects of CEO skill which are otherwise 
difficult to observe. On the simplest level, a recession tests whether a CEO has anticipated and 
properly prepared for the downturn, and such preparation is likely an important part of CEO 
performance. This hypothesis does not argue against relative performance evaluation, but simply 
posits that relative performance evaluation yields more informative signals in recessions. The 
testable implication of this hypothesis is that CEO turnover should be more sensitive to firm-
specific performance in recessions than in booms. In Section IV.C we test this prediction by 
interacting  firm-specific  performance  with  indicators  for  low,  medium,  and  high  industry 
performance in the CEO turnover regressions.   15 
  
Hypotheses 1 to 3 show that an effect of peer group performance on CEO dismissals may be the 
result of efficient and rational decision making by corporate boards. The next two hypotheses are 
behavioral and explain a peer performance effect on CEO turnover based on either systematic 
performance attribution errors or on limited investor attention. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Corporate boards commit systematic attribution errors 
Corporate boards and shareholders may make systematic mistakes in attributing performance and 
blame CEOs for bad performance caused by factors beyond their control. Social psychologists 
and economists studying attribution have found that subjects tend to take insufficient account of 
background and environmental factors, and as a result credit and blame individuals too much for 
observed outcomes.
16 Boards may therefore dismiss their CEO following bad performance even 
if  the  bad  performance  is  (partly)  caused  by  industry  or  market  shocks.  Bertrand  and 
Mullainathan (2001) offer the same argument in the CEO compensation context.
17 The effect of 
attribution errors on forced CEO turnovers is unlikely to affect all CEOs symmetrically. During 
recessions, CEOs who outperform their peer group are likely to bring that fact to the board’s 
attention  and  to  argue  successfully  against  being  punished  for  bad  performance  caused  by 
outside factors. Underperforming CEOs, on the other hand, are less able to defend themselves 
against attribution errors in recessions, but are happy to hide behind high industry performance 
in booms. It follows that industry performance should have only weak effects on outperforming 
CEOs, but should strongly affect the likelihood of dismissal for underperforming CEOs. We test 
this hypothesis in Section IV.D by separately estimating the effect of peer performance on CEO 
turnover for under- and outperforming CEOs.  
 
                                                 
16 Systematic attribution errors have been documented in several contexts. Shea (1998) finds that the salaries of 
Major League baseball hitters (pitchers) are higher (lower) in more hitter-friendly home ballparks. Durell (2001) 
provides  experimental  evidence  that  employers  underweight  task  difficulty  when  assessing  the  productivity  of 
employees. Weber, Rottenstreich, Camerer, and Knez (2001) find that experimental subjects tend to underweight 
group size when assessing the ability of group leaders to inspire coordination outcomes. Wolfers (2002) shows that 
U.S. voters irrationally reward state governors for economic fluctuations that are likely unrelated to gubernatorial 
actions. For instance, governors in oil-producing states are more likely to be re-elected following a rise in oil prices, 
while governors in the rust-belt are more likely to be ousted. 
17 A related and observationally equivalent hypothesis is that hindsight bias leads boards to dismiss CEOs after a 
negative industry or market shock because boards incorrectly believe the CEO should have seen the shock coming 
and should have prepared for it. See Camerer and Malmendier (2004) for further discussion of this idea.    16 
Hypothesis 5: Shareholder attention is triggered by low absolute performance 
Shareholders may not be able to monitor all firms in their portfolios simultaneously, and may 
instead selectively direct their scrutiny to firms which have triggered their attention. Bertrand 
and  Mullainathan  (2001)  propose  that  absolute  performance  measures  like  stock  returns, 
accounting  returns,  or  sales  growth  are  easily  observable  and  likely  to  function  as  attention 
triggers  for  otherwise  passive  investors.  Once  investors  pay  attention  to  a  firm,  we  expect 
underperforming CEOs to be removed and outperforming CEOs to be retained. This hypothesis 
has three testable implications: First, larger and more high-profile firms which are likely to be 
continuously monitored by the press and institutional investors should show a smaller effect of 
peer performance on CEO turnovers. Second, efficient filtering of peer performance from the 
CEO dismissal decision should obtain after low absolute returns because investors have woken 
up and correctly assess CEO performance. It follows that peer group performance should not 
affect forced CEO turnovers for firms with very low levels of prior returns. Finally, and similar 
to  Hypothesis  3  above,  the  effect  of  firm-specific  performance  on  CEO  turnover  should  be 
strongest when peer performance is low, as shareholders are more likely to pay attention. We test 
these implications in Sections IV.C and IV.E.
18 
 
To summarize, there are both rational and behavioral explanations for an effect of peer group 
performance  on  the  likelihood  of  forced  CEO  turnover.  Under  the  first  three  hypotheses 
discussed, a negative correlation between peer group performance and CEO dismissals is an 
efficient  contracting  outcome,  while  under  the  last  two  hypotheses  it  is  a  symptom  of  a 
behavioral inefficiency. We analyze the stock market reaction to turnover announcements for 
suggestive evidence of which view is closer to the truth in Section IV.F.
19 
 
                                                 
18 Given that the board of directors of each firm monitors one firm only, it is fair to ask why corporate boards do not 
pay attention to relative CEO performance continuously and independently of absolute performance. A possible 
explanation is that corporate boards are ineffective monitors and under CEOs’ thumbs except when faced with 
attentive shareholders. 
19 The executive compensation literature provides a number of explanations for the absence of relative performance 
evaluation in CEO pay above and beyond the ones discussed in the text above. Examples are marginal products of 
CEO labor which rise and fall with industry fortunes (Barro and Barro (1990), Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), 
Oyer (2004), and Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2005)), the futility of indexing compensation when CEOs can 
trade the index (Core and Guay (2001), Jin (2002), Jenter (2002), Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003), and Garvey 
and Milbourn (2003)), and the favorable accounting treatment of non-indexed options compared to indexed options 
and restricted stock (Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) and Hall and Murphy (2003)). None of these explanations can 
explain our findings in the CEO turnover context.    17 
II. Data sources, sample construction, and variable definitions 
CEO turnover is observed for all firms in the Standard & Poors ExecuComp database for the 
time period 1993 to 2001. The ExecuComp sample contains information on the top executives of 
all firms in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P SmallCap indexes. We recognize a CEO 
turnover for each year in which the CEO identified in ExecuComp changes. We then search the 
Factiva news database for the exact turnover announcement date and classify each CEO turnover 
according to whether the turnover was forced or voluntary.  
 
The classification of turnovers into forced and voluntary follows Parrino (1997): all departures 
for which the press reports state that the CEO is fired, forced out, or retires or resigns due to 
policy differences or pressure, are classified as forced. All other departures for CEOs above and 
including age 60 are classified as not forced. All departures for CEOs below age 60 are reviewed 
further and classified as forced if either the article does not report the reason as death, poor 
health, or the acceptance of another position (including the chairmanship of the board), or the 
article reports that the CEO is retiring, but does not announce the retirement at least six months 
before the succession. Finally, the cases classified as forced can be reclassified as voluntary if 
the press reports convincingly explain the departure as due to previously undisclosed personal or 
business reasons that are unrelated to the firm’s activities. This careful classification scheme is 
necessary since CEOs are rarely openly fired from their positions.
20 We separately identify CEO 
turnovers caused by mergers and spin-offs and exclude them from our subsequent analysis. 
 
All accounting information comes from the Compustat Industrial Annual files, and all stock price 
and stock return information from the monthly CRSP tapes. Industry performance benchmarks 
are calculated as equal-weighted and value-weighted average stock returns for all firms available 
on CRSP in the same industry as the sample firm. Industries are defined using the Fama and 
French (1997) classification of firms into 48 industries. The corporate boards evaluating the 
CEOs in our sample inevitably have access to more precise measures of peer group performance 
than the market and industry benchmarks we employ. Using a less informative benchmark than 
the  board  in  our  tests  biases  us  in  favor  of  accepting  the  relative  performance  evaluation 
                                                 
20 Weisbach (1988), for example, analyzed 286 CEO changes over ten years and found only nine cases in which 
boards mentioned performance as an explicit reason why the CEO was replaced.   18 
hypothesis. We exclude each sample firm from the construction of its specific peer group index 
to eliminate any artificial correlation between peer group performance and CEO turnover.  
 
III. Empirical results  
 
A. Descriptive statistics   
Table 1 presents an overview of the new CEO turnover data set. The final sample has 2,548 
firms with 15,798 firm-year observations from 1993 to 2001 and contains 1,590 CEO turnovers. 
Of these CEO turnovers, 1,206 are classified as voluntary and 384 are classified as forced.
21 
Panel A shows the number of observations and the frequency of forced and voluntary CEO 
changes in the data. Panel B shows performance measures and firm characteristics by CEO 
retention outcome (CEO is retained, CEO leaves voluntarily, or CEO is dismissed). Firms in 
which the CEO is dismissed are smaller than firms with voluntary CEO turnover in terms of 
book  assets,  market  value  of  equity,  annual  sales,  and  number  of  employees.  Part  of  that 
difference is likely due to the fact that CEO dismissals are preceded by bad performance and 
associated declines in firm size. Average stock returns in the 12 months before a forced CEO 
turnover are -17.90%. Interestingly, the average equal-weighted industry return is lower before 
forced (13.01%) than before voluntary turnovers (16.45%) or CEO retentions (19.17%). Both 
differences are statistically significant. This suggests that CEO dismissals are most common in 
industries  which  have  performed  badly  and  appears  inconsistent  with  strong-form  relative 
performance evaluation. The same pattern obtains in weaker form for value-weighted industry 
returns, but the differences are not statistically significant.  
 
B. Testing for strong-form relative performance evaluation in CEO turnover 
The strong-form version of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis predicts that peer 
group performance is completely filtered  from the CEO retention decision. We estimate the 
sensitivity  of  CEO  turnover  to  peer  performance  using  the  two-stage  approach  described  in 
Section I.B, and use industry stock returns as measure of peer group performance in this section. 
The first stage regression partitions variation in firm performance into a predictable component 
                                                 
21 The number of voluntary and forced CEO turnovers is larger than in any of the prior papers which hand-classify 
CEO turnovers into forced and voluntary. The data sets used in previous studies are usually based on the Forbes 
executive compensation surveys and are therefore restricted to the 800 largest firms. See Parrino (1997), Huson, 
Parrino, and Starks (2001), and Dezso (2005) for some of the most extensive data sets used in prior studies.    19 
caused by the industry shock and a residual firm-specific component. The second stage regresses 
an indicator variable for forced CEO turnovers on the predicted value (the peer performance 
component)  and  the  residual  (the  firm-specific  performance  component)  from  the  first  stage 
regression.  We  include  industry  fixed  effects  in  the  second  stage  regression  to  account  for 
industry differences in the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.   
 
Table  2  presents  the  main  result  of  this  paper:  When  regressing  forced  CEO  turnover  on 
idiosyncratic firm performance and the component of firm performance predicted by industry 
performance,  both  idiosyncratic  and  predicted  performance  strongly  predict  CEO  dismissals. 
Column (1) uses equal-weighted industry returns over the previous twelve months as instrument 
for firm performance. Instead of the expected coefficient of zero on predicted firm performance 
in the second stage regression, we find that the point estimate on predicted performance (-1.848, 
robust t-stat 7.78) is almost as large as the point estimate on idiosyncratic performance (-2.246, 
robust t-stat 9.65). This implies that bad industry performance increases the likelihood of CEO 
dismissals almost as much as bad firm-specific performance. Industry performance is clearly not 
fully filtered from the CEO retention decision, and strong-form relative performance evaluation 
is rejected.  
 
Column  (2)  extends  the  performance  measurement  period  and  uses  equal-weighted  industry 
returns in year t-1 and year t-2 as instruments to predict company stock returns in two separate 
first  stage  regressions.  The  results  from  the  second  stage  regression  confirm  that  low  stock 
returns caused by bad industry performance predict CEO dismissals almost as strongly as low 
firm-specific stock returns. The estimated coefficient on idiosyncratic and predicted stock returns 
for the previous year are -2.245 (t-stat 9.89) and -2.209 (t-stat 7.71) respectively, and are -0.632 
(t-stat 5.23) and -1.056 (t-stat 4.56) for year t-2 respectively. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the 
analysis but replace equal-weighted industry returns by value-weighted industry returns. The 
negative coefficients on predicted performance in the second stage regression are smaller than 
before but remain large and statistically highly significant. The smaller effect of value-weighted 
industry performance on CEO turnover suggests that there may be better filtering of value-
weighted  than  of  equal-weighted  peer  performance  from  firm  performance,  a  possibility  we 
revisit below.   20 
 
The effect of industry performance on the likelihood of CEO dismissals is economically large. 
Table 3 presents the implied likelihood of a forced CEO turnover calculated from the Logit 
models in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2 using stock returns over the previous year as the 
measure of performance. The average implied probability of forced CEO turnover in the base 
case (all independent variables left at their actual values) is 2.4% and equal to the unconditional 
probability  of  a  forced  turnover  in  the  sample.  The  low  frequency  of  CEO  dismissals  is 
consistent  with  the  prior  literature.
22  The  average  implied  probability  of  a  forced  turnover 
increases to 3.25% (3.09%) when the component of firm performance  attributable to  equal-
weighted (value-weighted) industry performance is set to its 25
th percentile value. The average 
implied probability falls to 2.09% (2.13%) when the peer group component of performance is set 
to its 75
th percentile value. Hence a decline in the peer group component of firm performance 
from its 75
th to its 25




We  conclude  that  industry-wide  shocks  to  stock  returns  are  not  fully  filtered  from  firm 
performance  in  CEO  retention  decisions.  The  strong-form  relative  performance  evaluation 
hypothesis appears to be rejected by the data. This still leaves the possibility that corporate 
boards at least partially filter industry shocks from firm performance when assessing their CEO, 
a hypothesis we test in the next section. 
 
C. Testing for weak-form relative performance evaluation in CEO turnover 
Most of the prior literature on CEO compensation and CEO turnovers does not test for strong-
form  relative  performance  evaluation,  but  tests  a  weaker  implication  of  the  theory:  CEO 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Parrino (1997), and Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) for 
forced turnover probabilities of a similar magnitude. Kaplan (1999) reports that the relationship between executive 
turnover and firm performance in Japan and Germany is similar to the one in the United States. The low implied 
probabilities  of  forced  CEO  turnover  even  for  extreme  bad  performance  may  be  partly  due  to  the  turnover 
regressions not having the right functional form. In particular, the true performance-turnover relationship is likely to 
be non-linear,  with turnover  most  sensitive to performance  when performance is below certain  thresholds. We 
experiment with alternative functional forms in Section III.E and do find larger coefficients and larger implied 
turnover probabilities for underperforming CEOs. 
23  An  alternative  method  for  calculating  the  implied  probabilities  is  to  set  all  independent  variables  to  their 
respective means, rather than to their actual values, before varying the variable of interest. The advantage of the 
method used in Table 3 is that the implied probability of forced turnovers in the base case corresponds exactly to the 
empirical likelihood of forced CEO turnovers in the sample. Both methods deliver qualitatively similar results.   21 
dismissals  should  be  negatively  related  to  firm  performance,  holding  industry  performance 
constant, and positively related to industry performance, holding firm  performance constant. 
Unlike strong-form relative performance evaluation, the weak form of the hypothesis does not 
predict complete filtering of peer performance, and instead posits only that some filtering of peer 
performance from firm performance is done by corporate boards.  
 
Tests for weak-form relative performance evaluation do not use the two stage approach from the 
previous section, but instead simply regress forced CEO turnover on firm performance and peer 
performance. Table 4 provides some evidence consistent with partial filtering of industry shocks. 
Regressing forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance over the previous year, firm 
performance comes in strongly negatively and industry performance comes in with the opposite 
sign, as predicted. The coefficients on industry performance are much smaller in absolute value 
(between 0.360 and 0.811) than the coefficients on firm performance (between -2.246 and -
2.323) and have lower statistical significance, consistent with the previous result that industry 
shocks  are  far  from  fully  filtered  from  CEO  retention  decisions.
24  The  results  become  less 
consistent with weak-form relative performance evaluation when performance two years before 
the turnover decision is included in the regressions. The coefficient on industry performance in 
year t-2, predicted to be significantly positive, is insignificantly positive in the value-weighted 
industry  specification  and  borderline  significantly  negative  in  the  equal-weighted  industry 
specification.   
  
The findings in Table 4 support the notion that corporate boards do take at least some account of 
industry  performance  when  assessing  the  performance  of  their  CEO.  Interestingly,  the 
regressions using value-weighted industry returns as measure of peer performance (columns (3) 
and (4)) are more supportive of relative performance evaluation than the regressions using equal-
weighted  industry  returns,  suggesting  again  that  boards  may  do  a  better  job  filtering  value-
weighted industry performance from firm performance. One explanation for these findings is that 
                                                 
24 For complete filtering of industry performance from firm performance in the CEO retention decision, the ratio of 
the coefficients on industry performance and firm performance in Table 4 has to equal the average industry beta of 
the sample firms. In the notation of equations (7) and (8), complete filtering implies that  1 2 1 ' / ' β γ γ = − . Using the 
point estimates from column (1) in Tables 2 and 4, we have  2 1 ' / ' γ γ − = 0.360/2.246 = 0.160 and  1 β = 0.905. 
Hence theory predicts five to six times more intense filtering than observed in the data.   22 
boards intuitively benchmark the performance of their CEOs against the largest and most visible 
firms in their industry, but fail to properly account for other, less salient components of industry 
performance.   
 
D. Market returns as the measure of peer group performance 
The previous sections show that firm performance attributable to industry performance affects 
the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers. We examine next whether market-wide stock returns 
have similar effects. We again decompose firm performance into its peer group and its firm-
specific components using the two-stage regression approach described in Section I.B. 
 
Table 5 presents the results with peer performance measured as equal-weighted (columns (1) and 
(2)) and value-weighted (columns (3) and (4)) stock market returns. The results using equal-
weighted market returns are similar to the ones using industry returns: both the firm-specific and 
the market-induced performance components strongly affect the likelihood of CEO dismissals. 
The increase in the likelihood of a CEO dismissal caused by low market returns is of the same 
order of magnitude as the increase caused by low firm-specific returns. The rejection of the 
strong-form  relative  performance  evaluation  hypothesis  continues  to  hold  when  peer  group 
performance is measured by equal-weighted market returns.  
 
Interestingly, the same is not true when peer group performance is measured by value-weighted 
market returns. Value-weighted market returns have no effect on the likelihood of a forced CEO 
turnover,  even  though  the  first  stage  regressions  show  that  value-weighted  market  returns 
significantly predict firm-level returns. It appears that corporate boards take the performance of 
value-weighted  market  indexes  such  as  the  S&P  500  into  account  when  assessing  the 
performance of their CEO. This hypothesis is confirmed in Table 5B which uses single-stage 
regressions  to  show  that  forced  CEO  turnover  is  significantly  positively  related  to  value-
weighted (but not equal-weighted) market returns, holding firm stock returns constant. These 
findings  reinforce  the  impression  that  boards  may  use  rule-of-thumb  relative  performance 
evaluation  against  the  most  salient  benchmarks,  while  ignoring  less  directly  visible  outside 
influences on firm performance.   
   23 
E. Robustness tests 
We have subjected the regression results from Tables 2, 4, and 5 to a variety of robustness 
checks.  First,  we  have  replaced  the  second  stage  Logit  regressions  by  Multinomial  Logit 
regressions allowing for three CEO turnover outcomes: retention, voluntary turnover, and forced 
turnover. Table 6 presents the results from a two-stage Multinomial Logit model using stock 
returns over the previous year as measure of firm performance and industry returns as measure of 
peer performance. The coefficient estimates for forced CEO turnovers are remarkably similar to 
before,  with  both  idiosyncratic  and  peer  performance  strongly  predicting  CEO  dismissals. 
Unsurprisingly, the effects of the two performance components on voluntary CEO turnover are 
much weaker in their economic and their statistical significance. The results including stock 
returns for year t-2 and the results using market returns as measure of peer performance are 
similar and are omitted to conserve on space. 
 
The  second  robustness  test  re-estimates  all  regressions  allowing  for  firm-specific  peer 
performance sensitivities in the first stage regressions. Estimating firm-specific betas introduces 
estimation errors into the peer performance term in the CEO turnover regressions, as discussed in 
detail  in  Section  1.B.  We  do  not  allow  for  firm-specific  intercept  terms  in  the  first  stage 
regressions; doing so would attribute the average firm performance over the sample period to the 
“luck” component of performance and bias the tests towards rejecting the relative performance 
evaluation  hypothesis.
25  Table  7  reports  summary  statistics  for  the  estimated  firm-specific 
industry betas in Panel A and the results from the CEO turnover regressions using industries as 
peer group in Panel B. The peer performance effect on CEO dismissals remains economically 
and statistically highly significant, though smaller than in the base regressions in Table 2.  
 
In a further robustness test, we allow for a non-linear performance-turnover relationship. The 
assumption that firm performance enters linearly into the turnover regressions is common to the 
CEO turnover literature but is likely incorrect. For example, a moderate decrease in performance 
is likely to have a stronger effect on the likelihood of a CEO dismissal when performance is 
already  low  than  when  it  is  high.  The  correct  functional  form  for  the  relationship  between 
                                                 
25 In the CEO compensation context, Garvey and Milbourn (2004) do not include firm fixed effects in the first stage 
regressions based on the same argument. As expected, including firm fixed effects in our regressions strengthens the 
rejection of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis.    24 
performance and forced CEO turnover is unknown and likely varies across firms. A reasonable 
assumption  is  that  the  performance-turnover  relationship  differs  between  CEOs  who 
underperform and CEOs who outperform their peer groups, effectively allowing for a break-
point  in  the  idiosyncratic  performance-turnover  relationship  at  zero.  The  results  in  Table  8 
confirm that the effect of firm-specific performance on CEO dismissals is much stronger for 
firms with negative firm-specific performance, i.e. firms which underperform their industry.
26 
More importantly for our purposes, the estimated effect of peer group performance on CEO 
dismissals,  and  hence  the  rejection  of  the  relative  performance  evaluation  hypothesis,  is 
strengthened in Table 8. 
 
In additional unreported robustness checks, we vary the time period over which firm and peer 
group performance are measured before the turnover decision. We replace the robust standard 
errors in the second stage regressions with bootstrapped standard errors to correct for any biases 
caused by the inclusion of generated regressors. We drop the industry fixed effects from the 
second stage turnover regressions, thereby allowing average industry performance to affect the 
peer  performance  term.  None  of  these  modifications  changes  the  conclusion  that  both  firm-
specific and peer group performance strongly affect the likelihood of CEO dismissals.
27  
 
IV. A more detailed examination of the peer performance effect on CEO dismissals 
The results so far demonstrate that peer group performance in the form of industry and market 
returns is not fully filtered from CEO dismissal decisions. Instead, bad industry performance 
increases the likelihood of a CEO dismissal by almost as much as bad firm-specific performance. 
We have discussed a number of potential causes for an industry performance effect on forced 
CEO turnovers in Section I.C. In order to shed more light on why CEOs are more likely to be 
laid off when their peer group is not doing well, this section examines the relationship between 
CEO dismissals and peer group performance in more detail. 
 
                                                 
26 Goldman, Hazarika, and Shivdasani (2003) and Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf (2005) similarly argue for 
break-points in the performance-turnover relationship at zero, but define the break-point in terms of absolute levels 
of  performance  rather  than  relative  or  idiosyncratic  performance.  Both  papers  find  evidence  consistent  with  a 
stronger performance-turnover relationship at low levels of performance.  
27 The additional robustness tests are available from the authors upon request.   25 
A. The oligopolistic industry hypothesis  
Linking CEO retention decisions to rival firm performance may serve shareholders by softening 
competition in oligopolistic industries. Boards may dismiss CEOs for low industry performance 
if such performance is caused by CEO actions, for example because the CEO started a price war 
with  competitors.  This  strategic  interaction  hypothesis  predicts  that  the  effect  of  industry 
performance  on  CEO  turnover  should  vanish  as  the  industry  definition  broadens  (as  larger 
industries are less likely to be oligopolistic), and that the effect should be weaker for small firms 
(which are less likely to affect the product market equilibrium in their industry). The evidence 
presented so far speaks against the strategic interaction hypothesis: The 48 Fama and French 
(1997) industries used in our analysis are quite broad, with the majority of industries having 
more than one hundred publicly listed firms on CRSP at any point during the sample period. 
Furthermore, we saw in Table 5 that the peer group effect on forced CEO turnover persists when 
peer  performance  is  measured  as  equal-weighted  market  returns,  a  finding  that  is  hard  to 
reconcile with the strategic interaction hypothesis. 
 
Table 9 tests whether the effect of industry performance on CEO dismissals vanishes for firms 
which are small relative to their industry and therefore unlikely to affect the product market 
equilibrium. Small firms are identified as firms with equity market values below 1 percent of the 
total market value of all firms in the same industry found on CRSP (columns 1 and 2), or as 
firms with book assets below 1 percent of the total book assets of all firms in the same industry 
found on Compustat (columns 3 and 4). Independently of the exact definition of small firms, the 
results in Table 9 show that the industry component of firm performance continues to have a 
statistically  and  economically  large  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  a  forced  CEO  turnover.  We 
conclude that the strategic interaction hypothesis is unlikely to explain the documented peer 
performance effects on forced CEO turnover. 
 
B. The endogenous industry choice hypothesis  
Dye  (1992)  argues  that  relative  performance  evaluation  motivates  executives  to  invest  in 
industries where they can outperform their competitors, rather than in industries that offer the 
highest absolute returns. Efficient CEO evaluations may therefore not filter industry performance 
out if CEOs have (some) control over which industry their firm operates in. There is a simple fix   26 
for the problem described by Dye: select the peer group benchmark for each CEO before any 
industry relocation choices are made. Practically speaking, CEOs should be benchmarked against 
their competitors from several years ago to provide them with efficient incentives to move their 
firms into the best performing industries. We test the Dye hypothesis in Table 10 by re-running 
the base regressions from Table 2 with the industry affiliation lagged by five years, effectively 
comparing the current performance of each firm to the current performance of its competitors 
from five years ago. The results are almost unchanged from Table 2 and show a statistically and 
economically large effect of peer group performance on CEO dismissals. We conclude that the 
endogenous industry choice hypothesis is unlikely to explain the main result of this paper. 
 
C. Variation in the informativeness of performance between recessions and booms 
Industry or market-wide recessions may allow boards to learn more from firm performance about 
the quality of their CEO than booms, for example because recessions test aspects of CEO skill 
which are otherwise difficult to observe. The testable implication of this hypothesis is that CEO 
turnover should be more sensitive to firm-specific performance in recessions than in booms. We 
test this prediction in Table 11 by interacting firm-specific performance with indicators for low, 
medium,  and  high  industry  performance  in  the  CEO  turnover  regressions.  The  results  are 
supportive of the hypothesis tested when firm and peer group performance are measured over 
year t-1 before the turnover decision: the effect of firm-specific performance on CEO turnover is 
smallest when industry performance is high, and is largest when industry performance is low. 
The difference in slope coefficients is statistically significant at the 10% level in the equal-
weighted  industry  specifications  and  at  the  1%  level  in  the  value-weighted  industry 
specifications. The hypothesis is not supported by firm-specific performance in year t-2 which 
yields slope coefficients which are not significantly different from each other at different levels 
of industry performance. The results using equal-weighted market returns as measure of peer 
performance are again supportive of the hypothesis tested, and show an effect of firm-specific 
performance on CEO dismissals that is largest at low levels of market performance.
28  
 
                                                 
28 Value-weighted market returns have again no effect on CEO dismissals, as already documented in Table 5. The 
regression results using market returns as measure of peer performance are omitted to conserve on space and are 
available from the authors.   27 
D. The systematic attribution error hypothesis 
Corporate boards and shareholders may make systematic mistakes in attributing performance, 
and  credit  or  blame  CEOs  for  performance  caused  by  factors  beyond  their  control.  Such 
systematic  attribution  errors  are  unlikely  to  affect  all  CEOs  symmetrically.  CEOs  who 
outperform their peer group are able to bring that fact to the board’s attention and are unlikely to 
be dismissed during a downturn. CEOs who underperform their peer group, on the other hand, 
are less able to defend themselves against attribution errors in downturns, but are happy to hide 
behind good industry performance in booms. The attribution errors hypothesis therefore predicts 
that industry performance should have only weak effects on outperforming CEOs, but should 
strongly affect the likelihood of dismissal for underperforming CEOs.  
 
Table 12 tests this hypothesis by estimating whether the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to peer 
group performance depends on whether a CEO underperforms or outperforms her benchmark. 
We  find  that  the  effect  of  industry-induced  performance  on  CEO  dismissals  previously 
documented is almost entirely restricted to firms which underperform their benchmarks. There is 
almost no effect of peer group performance on the likelihood of a dismissal for CEOs who 
outperform their industries. Similar results obtain when peer performance is measured as equal-
weighted market returns (unreported). These findings are consistent with the idea that boards 
commit  systematic  attribution  errors  when  evaluating  their  CEOs,  and  that  these  attribution 
errors mainly affect the dismissal likelihood for underperforming CEOs.
29  
 
E. The limited investor attention hypothesis  
According to the limited investor attention hypothesis, otherwise passive shareholders scrutinize 
firms more closely during bad times because shareholder attention has been triggered by low 
stock returns or other easily observable variables. This hypothesis is consistent with the result in 
the previous section that the peer performance effect on CEO dismissals is strongest for CEOs 
who underperform at the same time. In unreported results, we repeat the base regressions from 
Tables  2  and  5  for  firms  in  the  S&P  500  index  only.  Since  these  firms  are  likely  to  be 
continuously  monitored  by  the  press  and  professional  investors,  we  would  expect  that CEO 
                                                 
29 The result is also consistent with the hypothesis from the previous section that firm-specific performance is more 
informative about CEO quality in recessions than in booms.    28 
dismissals are less sensitive to peer group performance. The results are virtually unchanged from 
Tables 2 and 5 and from the results for small firms in Table 9, which we interpret as evidence 
against the limited attention hypothesis.  
 
In this section we perform a more direct test of the limited attention hypothesis: If investors start 
paying attention to CEO performance after low absolute returns, then we should expect efficient 
filtering of peer  group  performance  from the  CEO dismissal decision after low returns. We 
therefore sort our sample by the level of prior returns, and test whether the industry component 
of  firm  performance  continues  to  affect  CEO  turnovers  even  in  firms  with  very  bad  prior 
performance. Table 13 repeats the base regressions from Table 2, but restricts the second stage 
CEO turnover regressions to firm-years with negative returns (columns (1) and (3)) and firm-
years with returns below -20% (columns (2) and (4)). The estimated coefficients on the industry-
component of firm performance are as large and significant as the ones estimated for the full 
sample in Table 2. We conclude that even for firms with prior stock returns below -20%, worse 
industry performance increases the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover. These results are further 
evidence  against  the  limited  attention  hypothesis  as  an  explanation  for  the  role  of  peer 
performance in CEO dismissals.   
 
F. Stock price reactions to forced CEO turnovers across the industry business cycle 
In this section we measure the stock market reaction to the announcement of a forced CEO 
turnover. In particular, we are interested in whether the stock market views the more frequent 
CEO dismissals in industry recessions as better or worse news than the less frequent dismissals 
in industry booms. A crucial caveat to this analysis is that the stock price reaction measures only 
new information released on the announcement date, and conflates the market reaction to the 
dismissal with the reaction to any other news revealed about the firm at the announcement. For 
example, the market may react negatively to a CEO dismissal not because the market views the 




                                                 
30 Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the stock price reaction to CEO turnovers should be negative if the 
CEO is fired on the basis of private information of the board, and positive if the CEO is fired on the basis of public 
information.   29 
Table 14 measures the market-adjusted stock price reaction to forced CEO turnovers using three 
and five trading day windows around the announcement date. The average stock price reaction in 
this  sample  is  negative  and  statistically  significant.  Comparing  dismissals  of  CEOs  who 
outperformed their industries to dismissals of underperforming CEOs, we find that the market 
reaction appears to be more negative for CEOs who outperform, even though the difference is 
not statistically significant. The more negative reaction to the dismissal of outperforming CEOs 
may be due to the fact that such dismissals are much less common and hence more surprising. 
Most interesting from our perspective, Table 14 shows that the stock market reaction to CEO 
dismissals does not depend on whether the CEO turnover occurs in an industry recession or an 
industry boom. All differences between the announcement returns across the business cycle have 
t-statistics  below  one.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  market  views  the  more  frequent  CEO 
dismissals in industry recessions as different from the less frequent dismissals in industry booms. 
 
V. Conclusion  
Using a new hand-collected CEO turnover data set from 1993 to 2001, we document that low 
industry stock returns and low market returns significantly increase the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnovers.  The  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  a  forced  turnover  following  bad  peer  group 
performance is concentrated on CEOs who underperform their peer group at the same time. We 
find some evidence that boards partially filter industry performance from their assessment of 
CEO quality, but the extent of the filtering is too limited to remove most of the peer performance 
effect. We conclude that boards fail to fully filter what appear to be exogenous shocks to firm 
performance from their CEO retention decisions. 
 
We consider several explanations for the failure of relative performance evaluation in our CEO 
turnover sample. While far from conclusive, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
corporate boards commit systematic attribution errors and credit or blame CEOs for performance 
caused  by  factors  beyond  their  control.  There  appears  to  be  more  filtering  of  more  salient 
measures  of  peer  performance,  such  as  the  returns  to  the  value-weighted  market  index, 
suggesting that boards may use some imperfect rule-of-thumb relative performance evaluation 
when  assessing  CEO  quality.  We  emphasize  that  our  results  are  also  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis that firm performance in recessions is more revealing about CEO skill than firm   30 
performance in booms, leaving the possibility that the observed patterns reflect efficient learning 
about  CEO  quality  by  corporate  boards.  Independently  of  the  underlying  mechanism,  the 
documented  effect  of  industry  and  market  performance  on  CEO  turnover  has  interesting 
implications for our understanding of CEO incentives and horizons.    31 
References 
Adams, Renee B. and Ferreira, Daniel, 2005, A theory of friendly boards, forthcoming, Journal 
of Finance. 
Aggarwal,  Rajesh  K.,  and  Andrew  A.  Samwick,  1999,  Executive  compensation,  strategic 
competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence, Journal of Finance, 54, 
p. 1999-2043. 
Albuquerque,  Ana,  2005,  Who  are  your  peers?  A  study  of  relative  performance  evaluation, 
Working Paper, Simon School of Business, University of Rochester, January. 
Antle, Rick, and Abbie J. Smith, 1986, An empirical investigation of the relative performance 
evaluation of corporate executives, Journal of Accounting Research, 24(1), p. 1-39. 
Barro, Jason R., and Robert J. Barro, 1990, Pay, performance, and turnover of bank CEOs, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 8, p. 48-481. 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jesse M. Fried, and David I. Walker, 2001, Executive compensation in 
America: Optimal contracting or extraction of rents?, The Berkeley Law & Economics Working 
Papers, 2001(2), Article 10.  
Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001, Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones 
without principles are, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), p. 901-32. 
Blackwell,  David  W.,  James  A.  Brickley,  and  Michael  S.  Weisbach,  1994,  Accounting 
information and internal evaluation: Evidence from Texan banks, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 17(3), p. 331-359. 
Camerer, Colin F., and Ulrike Malmendier, 2004, Behavioral organizational economics, Working 
Paper, Stanford University Graduate School of Business, March. 
Core, John E., and Wayne R. Guay, 2001, When contracts require risk-averse executives to hold 
equity: Implications for option valuation and relative performance evaluation, Working Paper, 
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
Core, John E., Wayne R. Guay, and David F. Larcker, 2003, Executive equity compensation and 
incentives: A survey, Economic Policy Review 9, p. 27-50. 
Core,  John  E.,  Wayne  R.  Guay,  and  Robert  E.  Verrecchia,  2003,  Price  versus  non-price 
performance measures in optimal CEO compensation contracts, The Accounting Review 78, p. 
957-981. 
Coughlan, Anne, and Ronald Schmidt, 1985, Executive compensation, management turnover, 
and firm performance: An empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), 
p. 43-66.   32 
Denis, David J., Diane K. Denis, and Atulya Sarin, 1997, Ownership structure and top executive 
turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 45, p. 193-222. 
Deszo,  Cristian,  2005,  Entrenchment  and  changes  in  performance  following  CEO  turnover, 
Working Paper, Stern School of Business, New York University, August. 
Diamond,  Douglas  W.,  and  Robert  E.  Verrechia,  1982,  Optimal  managerial  contracts  and 
equilibrium security prices, Journal of Finance, 37, p. 275 -288. 
Durell, Alan, 2001, Attribution in performance evaluation, Working Paper, Dartmouth College, 
March.  
Dye,  Ronald  A.,  1992,  Relative  performance  evaluation  and  project  selection,  Journal  of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 30 No. 1, Spring, p. 27-52. 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1997, Industry costs of equity, Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, p. 153-193.  
Fershtman,  Chaim,  and  Kenneth  L.  Judd,  1987,  Equilibrium  incentives  in  oligopoly,  The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No. 5., p. 927-940. 
Garen, John E., 1994, Executive compensation and principal-agent theory, Journal of Political 
Economy, 102(6), p. 1175-1199. 
Garvey, Gerald T., and Todd T. Milbourn, 2003, Incentive compensation when executives can 
hedge the market:  Evidence of relative performance evaluation in the cross-section, Journal of 
Finance, 58-4, p. 1557-1582.  
Garvey, Gerald T., and Todd T. Milbourn, 2004, Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: 
Executives  are  rewarded  for  good  luck  but  not  penalized  for  bad,  forthcoming,  Journal  of 
Financial Economics. 
Gibbons,  Robert,  and  Kevin  J.  Murphy,  1990,  Relative  performance  evaluation  for  chief 
executive officers, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43(3), p. 30-51. 
Goldman, Eitan, Sonali Hazarika, and Anil Shivdasani, 2003, What determines CEO turnover?, 
Working Paper, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill, 
September.  
Hall, Brian J., and Kevin J. Murphy, 2003, The trouble with stock options, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Volume 17, Number 3, p. 49-70. 
Heckman,  James  J.,  1981,  The  incidental  parameters  problem  and  the  problem  of  initial 
conditions in estimating a discrete time – discrete data stochastic process, in C. F. Manski and D. 
McFadden  (eds.),  Structural  Analysis  of  Discrete  Data  with  Econometric  Applications,  MIT 
Press.  
Hermalin, Benjamin E., 2005, Trends in corporate governance, Journal of Finance, forthcoming.   33 
Himmelberg, Charles P., and R. Glenn Hubbard, 2000, Incentive pay and the market for CEOs: 
An analysis of pay-for-performance sensitivity, Working Paper, Columbia University, March. 
Hirshleifer, David, and Anjan V. Thakor, 1998, Corporate control through board dismissals and 
takeovers, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 7(4), p. 489-520.  
Holmström, Bengt, 1979, Moral hazard and observability, Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 74-91. 
Holmström, Bengt, 1982, Moral hazard in teams, Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324-340. 
Huson, Mark R., Robert Parrino, and Laura T. Starks, 2001, Internal monitoring mechanisms and 
CEO turnover: A long term perspective, Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, p. 2265-2297.  
Janakiraman,  Surya  N.,  Richard  A.  Lambert,  and  David  F.  Larker,  1992,  An  empirical 
investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis, Journal of Accounting Research, 
30, 53-69. 
Jenter, Dirk, 2002, Executive compensation, incentives, and risk, Working Paper, MIT Sloan 
School of Management, April. 
Jin,  Li,  2002,  CEO  compensation,  diversification  and  incentives,  Journal  of  Financial 
Economics, 66(1), 29-63. 
Kaplan,  Steven  N.,  1999,  Top  Executive  Incentives  in  Germany,  Japan  and  the  U.  S.:  A 
Comparison, in Executive Compensation and Shareholder Value, Jennifer Carpenter and David 
Yermack, eds. 
Murphy, Kevin J., 1985, Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical 
investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3), p. 11-42.  
Murphy, Kevin J., 1999, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.),  
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3b, Elsevier Science North Holland, Chapter 38: 2485-
2563. 
Oyer,  Paul,  2004,  Why  do  firms  use  incentives  that  have  no  incentive  effects?,  Journal  of 
Finance, 59(4), 1619-1649. 
Parrino, Robert, 1997, CEO turnover and outside succession: A cross-sectional analysis, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 46(2), p. 165-197. 
Rajgopal, Shivaram, Terry Shevlin, and Valentina Zamora, 2005, CEOs’ outside employment 
opportunities  and  the  lack  of  relative  performance  evaluation  in  compensation  contracts, 
forthcoming, Journal of Finance. 
Salancik,  Gerald  R.,  and  Jeffrey  Pfeffer,  1980,  Effects  of  ownership  and  performance  on 
executive tenure in U.S. corporations, Academy of Management Journal, 23, p. 653-664.   34 
Shea,  John,  1998,  Nominal  illusion:  Evidence  from  major  league  baseball,  Working  Paper, 
University of Maryland. 
Sklivas,  Steven  D.,  1987,  The  strategic  choice  of  managerial  incentives,  RAND  Journal  of 
Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 452-458. 
Warner, Jerold B., Ross L. Watts, and Karen H. Wruck, 1988, Stock prices and top management 
changes, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, p. 461-492. 
Warther,  Vincent  A.,  1998,  Board  effectiveness  and  board  dissent:  A  model  of  the  board's 
relationship to management and shareholders, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 4 (1), p. 53-
70. 
Weber, Roberto, Colin Camerer, Yuval Rottenstreich, and Marc Knez, 2001, The illusion of 
leadership: Misattribution of cause in coordination games, Organization Science, 12(5), p. 582-
598.  
Weisbach,  Michael  S.,  1988,  Outside  directors  and  CEO  turnover,  Journal  of  Financial 
Economics, 20, p. 431-460. 
Wolfers,  Justin,  2002,  Are  voters  rational?  Evidence  from  gubernatorial  elections,  Working 
Paper, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, March. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 2002, Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press. 
Yatchew,  A.,  and  Z.  Griliches,  1985,  Specification  error  in  probit  models,  The  Review  of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, p. 134-139.   35 
Table 1 
Summary statistics 
This table presents an overview of the new CEO turnover data set. Panel A shows the number of 
observations and the frequency of forced and voluntary CEO turnovers in the sample. Panel B 
shows performance measures and firm characteristics by CEO retention outcome. 
                    










turnovers    
Average percentage 
of firms with at 
least one CEO 
turnover in a year 
Average percentage 
of firms with at least 
one forced CEO 
turnover in a year 
Average percentage 
of firms with at least 
one voluntary CEO 
turnover in a year 
15,798  384  1,206     9.47%  2.36%  7.47% 
 
 
                 
Panel B: Firm characteristics, firm performance, and industry performance by CEO turnover outcome 
   CEO is retained    
Voluntary 
CEO turnover    
CEO is 
dismissed 
  Firm characteristics 
Book assets ($m)  7,703    9,427    5,196 
Market value of equity ($m)  4,745    6,550    3,318 
Sales ($m)  3,345    4,478    3,268 
Number of employees  16,061    20,565    16,127 
           
  Firm and industry performance 
29.56%    12.63%    -17.90%  Stock return in the 12 months before the CEO turnover 
[S.E.]  [0.65]    [1.77]    [2.30] 
19.17%    16.45%    13.01%  EW industry stock return in the 12 months before the 
CEO turnover [S.E.]  [0.25]    [0.89]    [1.50] 
18.33%    17.50%    16.65%  VW industry stock return in the 12 months before the 
CEO turnover [S.E.]  [0.20]     [0.75]     [1.37] 
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Table 2 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns. The second stage Logit regressions predict forced CEO turnover using the predicted 
values and the residuals from the first stage regression as measures of the predicted (peer-group) 
and  of  the  idiosyncratic  component  of  company  stock  returns  respectively.  The  industry 
definitions follow the Fama and French (1997) classification into 48 industries. The second stage 
Logit regressions include industry fixed effects. All t- and z-statistics are calculated with robust 
standard errors clustered at the industry level.  
              
Panel A: First stage regressions of firm performance on industry performance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Constant  0.096  0.096  0.076  0.076 
  [5.06]***  [5.06]***  [3.97]***  [3.97]*** 
0.905  0.905      EW industry stock return 
in year t-1  [11.30]***  [11.30]***     
    1.036  1.036  VW industry stock return 
in year t-1        [9.37]***  [9.37]*** 
R-squared  0.12  0.12  0.10  0.10 
   
Firm stock 
return in year t-2   
Firm stock 
return in year t-2 
Constant    0.097    0.063 
    [5.78]***    [3.72]*** 
  0.884      EW industry stock return 
in year t-2    [15.12]***     
      1.089  VW industry stock return 
in year t-2           [12.00]*** 
R-squared     0.12     0.11 
              
Panel B: Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and 










Constant  -19.536  -19.276  -19.637  -19.519 
  [301.10]***  [232.92]***  [211.40]***  [118.82]*** 
-2.246  -2.246  -2.323  -2.298  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1  [9.65]***  [9.90]***  [10.11]***  [9.52]*** 
-1.848  -2.210  -1.540  -1.623  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-1  [7.78]***  [7.73]***  [6.44]***  [6.43]*** 
  -0.633    -0.683  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-2    [5.26]***    [5.90]*** 
  -1.058    -0.495  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-2    [4.56]***    [2.37]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 3 
Implied probabilities of a forced CEO turnover 
The  implied  probabilities  of  a  forced  CEO  turnover  are  calculated  using  the  second  stage 
regression  coefficients  from  columns  (1)  and  (3)  of  Table  2.  For  the  base  case  implied 
probability, all independent variables are set equal to their actual values in the data and the 
associated implied probabilities are averaged across all observations. This implied probability 
equals the observed likelihood of forced CEO turnovers in the data. The implied probability is 
varied by setting either the idiosyncratic or the predicted component of firm performance equal 
to their 25th or 75th percentile values. The other independent variables remain at their actual 
values.  
        
Implied probabilities of a forced CEO turnover for different levels of the 
independent variables 
  
Peer group performance 
measured as EW 
industry returns over the 
previous year 
Peer group performance 
measured as VW 
industry returns over the 
previous year 
  Implied likelihood of a forced CEO turnover 
Base Case  2.40%  2.40% 
Peer-group induced stock 
return set to 25th percentile  3.25%  3.09% 
Peer-group induced stock 
return set to 75th percentile  2.09%  2.13% 
Idiosyncratic stock return set to 
25th percentile  3.03%  2.92% 
Idiosyncratic stock return set to 
75th percentile  1.06%  1.02% 
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Table 4 
Single-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance 
The single-stage Logit regressions regress forced CEO turnover on company and industry stock 
returns.  The  industry  definitions  follow  the  Fama  and  French  (1997)  classification  into  48 
industries, and the regressions include industry fixed effects. All z-statistics are calculated with 
robust standard errors clustered at the industry level.  
              
Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on firm performance and industry performance 










         
Constant  -19.498  -19.314  -19.577  -19.456 
  [1082.46]***  [516.66]***  [240.51]***  [133.75]*** 
Firm stock return in year t-1  -2.246  -2.246  -2.323  -2.298 
  [9.65]***  [9.90]***  [10.11]***  [9.52]*** 
0.360  0.033      EW industry stock return in 
year t-1  [2.30]**  [0.18]     
    0.811  0.699  VW industry stock return 
in year t-1      [4.08]***  [3.80]*** 
Firm stock return in year t-2    -0.633    -0.683 
    [5.26]***    [5.90]*** 
  -0.376      EW industry stock return in 
year t-2    [1.57]     
      0.205  VW industry stock return 
in year t-2        [0.87] 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 5 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and stock market 
performance 
The first stage regressions use market-wide stock returns to predict contemporaneous company 
stock  returns.  The  second  stage  Logit  regressions  predict  forced  CEO  turnover  using  the 
predicted values and the residuals from the first stage regression as measures of the predicted 
(peer-group) and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock returns respectively. The 
second stage Logit regressions include industry fixed effects using the Fama and French (1997) 
classification into 48 industries. All t- and z-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors 
clustered at the industry level.  
              
Panel A: First stage regressions of firm performance on market performance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Constant  0.128  0.128  0.133  0.133 
  [9.15]***  [9.15]***  [7.54]***  [7.54]*** 
0.732  0.732      EW market return in year 
t-1  [5.55]***  [5.55]***     
    0.766  0.766  VW market return in 
year t-1        [5.32]***  [5.32]*** 
R-squared  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02 
   
Firm stock 
return in year t-2   
Firm stock 
return in year t-2 
Constant    0.111    0.047 
    [6.48]***    [2.87]*** 
  0.792      EW market return in year 
t-2    [8.42]***     
      1.162  VW market return in 
year t-2           [10.64]*** 
R-squared     0.04     0.04 
              
Panel B: Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and 










Constant  -19.593  -18.808  -20.005  -19.981 
  [172.84]***  [57.94]***  [125.57]***  [101.93]*** 
-2.190  -2.180  -2.299  -2.262  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1  [9.37]***  [9.64]***  [9.91]***  [9.45]*** 
-1.700  -3.062  -0.214  -0.368  Market-induced stock 
return in year t-1  [4.41]***  [5.60]***  [0.39]  [0.71] 
  -0.657    -0.698  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-2    [5.89]***    [6.19]*** 
  -1.954    0.031  Market-induced stock 
return in year t-2    [3.37]***    [0.10] 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 5B 
Single-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and stock market 
performance 
The single-stage Logit regressions regress forced CEO turnover on company stock returns and 
market-wide returns. The industry definitions follow the Fama and French (1997) classification 
into  48  industries,  and  the  regressions  include  industry  fixed  effects.  All  z-statistics  are 
calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level.  
              
Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on firm performance and market performance 










         
Constant  -19.53  -19.065  -19.728  -19.695 
  [217.53]***  [97.08]***  [244.99]***  [189.52]*** 
Firm stock return in year t-1  -2.190  -2.180  -2.299  -2.262 
  [9.37]***  [9.64]***  [9.91]***  [9.45]*** 
0.358  -0.646      EW market return in year t-1 
[1.21]  [1.53]     
    1.597  1.451  VW market return in year t-1 
    [3.51]***  [3.32]*** 
Firm stock return in year t-2    -0.657    -0.698 
    [5.89]***    [6.19]*** 
  -1.027      EW market return in year t-2 
  [2.18]**     
      0.847  VW market return in year t-2 
      [2.45]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       41 
Table 6 
Two-stage Multinomial Logit regressions of voluntary and forced CEO turnover on firm 
and industry performance 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns.  The  second  stage  Multinomial  Logit  regressions  predict  voluntary  and  forced  CEO 
turnover using the predicted values and the residuals from the first stage regression as measures 
of  the  predicted  (peer-group)  and  of  the  idiosyncratic  component  of  company  stock  returns 
respectively. The industry definitions follow the Fama and French (1997) classification into 48 
industries.  The  second  stage  Logit  regressions  include  industry  fixed  effects.  All  t-  and  z-
statistics are calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level.  
                 
Panel A: First stage regressions of firm performance on industry performance 
  (1)    (2) 
  Firm stock return in year t-1    Firm stock return in year t-1 
Constant  0.096    0.076 
  [5.06]***    [3.97]*** 
0.905      EW industry stock return 
in year t-1  [11.30]***     
    1.036  VW industry stock return 
in year t-1        [9.37]*** 
R-squared  0.12     0.10 
                 
Panel B: Second stage Multinomial Logit regressions of voluntary and forced CEO 
turnover on peer-group induced and idiosyncratic firm performance 










Constant  -1.644  -26.433    -1.700  -26.541 
  [50.59]***  [420.12]***    [33.45]***  [291.50]*** 
-0.470  -2.289    -0.509  -2.370  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1  [4.88]***  [9.74]***    [5.19]***  [10.20]*** 
-0.440  -1.888    -0.217  -1.557  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-1  [2.18]**  [7.63]***    [0.93]  [6.33]*** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 7 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance 
using firm-specific beta estimates 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns  and  allow  for  variation  in  the  industry  sensitivities  of  monthly  firm-level  log  stock 
returns. The second stage Logit regressions predict forced CEO turnover using the cumulated 
predicted values and residuals from the first stage regression as measures of the predicted (peer-
group) and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock returns respectively. The industry 
definitions follow the Fama and French (1997) classification into 48 industries. The second stage 
Logit regressions include industry fixed effects. All t- and z-statistics are calculated with robust 
standard errors clustered at the industry level.  
              
Panel A: Firm-specific beta estimates from first stage regressions of firm performance on industry 
performance 
 
Monthly firm log stock return on 
EW industry performance 
Monthly firm log stock return on 
VW industry performance 
Average beta estimate  0.881  0.893 
Median beta estimate  0.845  0.875 
1st percentile beta 
estimate  0.032  0.047 
99th percentile beta 
estimate  2.062  2.120 
              
Panel B: Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and 
idiosyncratic firm performance 










Constant  -19.378  -19.186  -19.342  -19.183 
  [155.77]***  [130.38]***  [185.04]***  [489.92]*** 
-1.723  -1.645  -1.69  -1.624  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1  [14.60]***  [14.72]***  [17.24]***  [16.49]*** 
-0.934  -1.122  -0.711  -0.894  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-1  [5.71]***  [7.54]***  [3.24]***  [3.87]*** 
  -0.714    -0.743  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-2    [8.45]***    [9.25]*** 
  -0.933    -0.672  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-2    [3.71]***    [1.86]* 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 8 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance  
Different turnover-performance slopes for under- and outperformers 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns and are reported in Panel A of Table 2. The second stage Logit regressions predict forced 
CEO turnover using the predicted values and the residuals from the first stage regression as 
measures of the predicted (peer-group) and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock 
returns respectively. Underperformers and outperformers are defined as firms with negative or 
positive firm-specific residual performance in the first stage regressions respectively. The second 
stage  Logit  regressions  include  industry  fixed  effects  using  the  Fama  and  French  (1997) 
classification into 48 industries. All t- and z-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors 
clustered at the industry level. 
              
Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and idiosyncratic firm 
performance 
 
Peer performance measured as EW 
industry stock returns 
Peer performance measured as VW 
industry stock returns 










Constant  -19.521  -19.27  -19.3  -19.22 
  [254.99]***  [246.89]***  [556.08]***  [98.23]*** 
-0.872  -0.899  -0.779  -0.782  Positive idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1 (outperformer)  [3.94]***  [3.22]***  [2.79]***  [2.57]** 
-2.689  -2.648  -2.774  -2.712  Negative idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1 (underperformer)  [12.05]***  [14.53]***  [13.32]***  [14.06]*** 
-2.065  -2.397  -1.739  -1.786  Industry-induced stock return in 
year t-1  [8.68]***  [9.49]***  [7.09]***  [7.32]*** 
  -0.379    -0.394  Positive idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-2 (outperformer)    [1.46]    [1.42] 
  -0.884    -0.932  Negative idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-2 (underperformer)    [3.02]***    [3.15]*** 
  -1.191    -0.659  Industry-induced stock return in 
year t-2    [4.15]***    [2.46]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 9 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance  
Small firms only 
The estimation is performed for firms with equity market values less than 1% of total industry 
market value (columns 1 and 2) and for firms with book assets less than 1% of total industry 
book assets (columns 3 and 4) only. The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to 
predict contemporaneous company stock returns. The second stage  Logit regressions predict 
forced CEO turnover using the predicted values and the residuals from the first stage regression 
as measures of the predicted (peer-group) and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock 
returns respectively. The second stage Logit regressions include industry fixed effects using the 
Fama and French (1997) classification into 48 industries. All t- and z-statistics are calculated 
with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. 
              
Panel A: First stage regressions of firm performance on industry performance 
         
 
Market value less than 1% of 
industry market value 
Book assets less than 1% of 
industry books assets 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Firm stock return 
in year t-1 
Firm stock return 
in year t-1 
Firm stock return 
in year t-1 
Firm stock return 
in year t-1 
         
Constant  0.079  0.059  0.080  0.066 
  [3.64]***  [2.69]**  [3.50]***  [2.64]** 
0.970    1.016    EW industry stock return 
in year t-1  [12.26]***    [8.89]***   
  1.060    1.089  VW industry stock return 
in year t-1     [9.16]***     [6.68]*** 
R-squared  0.13  0.10  0.13  0.10 
              
Panel B: Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and idiosyncratic 
firm performance 










         
Constant  -4.290  -4.252  -18.9  -18.895 
  [48.27]***  [54.13]***  [238.30]***  [146.07]*** 
-2.211  -2.265  -2.005  -2.054  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1  [9.41]***  [9.76]***  [8.81]***  [9.28]*** 
-1.723  -1.450  -1.580  -1.315  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-1  [8.27]***  [6.55]***  [7.14]***  [5.36]*** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 10 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance 
Industry affiliation lagged by five years 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns. The industry  affiliations are lagged by  five  years so that each  firm is benchmarked 
against its competitors from five years ago. The second stage Logit regressions predict forced 
CEO turnover using the predicted values and the residuals from the first stage regression as 
measures of the predicted (peer-group) and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock 
returns respectively. The industry definitions follow the Fama and French (1997) classification 
into 48 industries. The second stage Logit regressions include industry fixed effects. All t- and z-
statistics are calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level.  
              
Panel A: First stage regressions of firm performance on industry performance 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Firm stock 
return in year t-1 
Constant  0.050  0.050  0.043  0.043 
  [3.59]***  [3.59]***  [2.81]***  [2.81]*** 
0.888  0.888      EW industry stock return 
in year t-1  [10.34]***  [10.34]***     
    0.872  0.872  VW industry stock return 
in year t-1        [7.88]***  [7.88]*** 
R-squared  0.14  0.14  0.10  0.10 
   
Firm stock 
return in year t-2   
Firm stock 
return in year t-2 
Constant    0.050    0.025 
    [3.17]***    [1.39] 
  0.859      EW industry stock return 
in year t-2    [11.18]***     
      0.922  VW industry stock return 
in year t-2           [8.28]*** 
R-squared     0.13     0.11 
              
Panel B: Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and 










Constant  -19.540  -18.962  -19.664  -19.306 
  [229.78]***  [157.59]***  [246.18]***  [107.17]*** 
-2.255  -2.213  -2.337  -2.269  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1  [8.32]***  [9.89]***  [9.04]***  [9.53]*** 
-1.748  -2.218  -1.306  -1.450  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-1  [6.42]***  [6.79]***  [3.85]***  [4.04]*** 
  -0.718    -0.807  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-2    [3.70]***    [4.05]*** 
  -1.650    -0.745  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-2    [4.44]***    [1.91]* 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       46 
Table 11 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance  
Different turnover-performance slopes for different levels of industry performance 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns and are reported in Panel A of Table 2. The second stage Logit regressions predict forced 
CEO turnover using the predicted values and the residuals from the first stage regression as 
measures of the predicted (peer-group) and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock 
returns  respectively.  The  second  stage  Logit  regressions  allow  for  different  effects  of 
idiosyncratic performance on CEO turnover depending on whether industry performance is in the 
bottom, middle, or top third of all observations. The second stage regressions include industry 
fixed effects using the Fama and French (1997) classification into 48 industries. All t- and z-
statistics are calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. 
              
Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and idiosyncratic firm performance 
 
Peer performance measured as EW 
industry stock returns 
Peer performance measured as VW 
industry stock returns 










Constant  -19.542  -19.307  -19.785  -19.657 
  [181.87]***  [183.90]***  [194.75]***  [157.61]*** 
-1.841  -1.872  -1.901  -1.883  Idiosyncratic stock return in year t-1: 
high industry performance  [4.95]***  [4.76]***  [7.28]***  [6.24]*** 
-2.314  -2.272  -2.298  -2.289  Idiosyncratic stock return in year t-1: 
medium industry performance  [11.96]***  [11.74]***  [10.22]***  [10.35]*** 
-2.592  -2.599  -2.986  -2.904  Idiosyncratic stock return in year t-1: 
low industry performance  [9.74]***  [10.71]***  [9.79]***  [9.55]*** 
-1.385  -1.740  -0.961  -1.058  Industry-induced stock return in 
year t-1  [3.96]***  [3.97]***  [3.66]***  [3.28]*** 
  -0.714    -0.855  Idiosyncratic stock return in year t-2: 
high industry performance    [4.17]***    [5.30]*** 
  -0.829    -0.505  Idiosyncratic stock return in year t-2: 
medium industry performance    [4.16]***    [2.59]*** 
  -0.300    -0.517  Idiosyncratic stock return in year t-2: 
low industry performance    [0.73]    [1.77]* 
  -1.072    -0.551  Industry-induced stock return in 
year t-2    [4.42]***    [2.08]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 12 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance  
Different industry performance effects for under- and outperformers 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns and are reported in Panel A of Table 2. The second stage Logit regressions predict forced 
CEO turnover using the predicted values and the residuals from the first stage regression as 
measures of the predicted (peer-group) and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock 
returns respectively. Underperformers and outperformers are defined as firms with negative or 
positive firm-specific residual performance in the first stage regressions respectively. The second 
stage  Logit  regressions  include  industry  fixed  effects  using  the  Fama  and  French  (1997) 
classification into 48 industries. All t- and z-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors 
clustered at the industry level. 
              
Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and idiosyncratic firm 
performance 
 
Peer performance measured as EW 
industry stock returns 
Peer performance measured as VW 
industry stock returns 










Constant  -19.592  -19.332  -19.693  -19.560 
  [515.24]***  [235.00]***  [202.58]***  [117.60]*** 
-2.507  -2.522  -2.504  -2.449  Idiosyncratic stock return in year 
t-1  [10.35]***  [11.26]***  [10.25]***  [10.06]*** 
-0.315  -0.598  -0.469  -0.695  Industry-induced stock return 
in year t-1 for outperformers  [0.48]  [0.81]  [0.69]  [0.85] 
-2.124  -2.506  -1.754  -1.811  Industry-induced stock return 
in year t-1 for underperformers  [7.83]***  [8.57]***  [6.06]***  [6.49]*** 
  -0.681    -0.753  Idiosyncratic stock return in year 
t-2    [4.18]***    [4.44]*** 
  -0.863    -0.273  Industry-induced stock return 
in year t-2 for outperformers    [2.01]**    [0.59] 
  -1.093    -0.580  Industry-induced stock return 
in year t-2 for underperformers    [3.99]***    [2.40]** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       48 
Table 13 
Two-stage Logit regressions of forced CEO turnover on firm and industry performance  
Firm-years with negative prior stock returns only 
The first stage regressions use industry stock returns to predict contemporaneous company stock 
returns. The second stage Logit regressions predict forced CEO turnover using the predicted 
values and the residuals from the first stage regression as measures of the predicted (peer-group) 
and of the idiosyncratic component of company stock returns respectively. The second stage 
regressions are run for firms with negative returns (columns (1) and (3)) or firms with returns 
below  -20  percent  (columns  (2)  and  (4))  only.  The  second  stage  Logit  regressions  include 
industry fixed effects using the Fama and French (1997) classification into 48 industries. All t- 
and z-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level. 
              
Panel A: First stage regressions of firm performance on industry performance 
         
  Firm stock return in year t-1  Firm stock return in year t-1 
Constant  0.096  0.076 
  [5.06]***  [3.97]*** 
0.905      EW industry stock return 
in year t-1  [11.30]***     
    1.036  VW industry stock return 
in year t-1        [9.37]*** 
R-squared  0.12  0.10 
              
Panel B: Second stage Logit regressions of CEO dismissals on peer-group induced and idiosyncratic 
firm performance conditional on low absolute performance 




















Constant  -19.573  -19.432  -19.65  -19.434 
  [104.91]***  [132.50]***  [102.23]***  [70.16]*** 
-3.006  -2.636  -3.079  -2.73  Idiosyncratic stock return 
in year t-1  [8.98]***  [6.92]***  [9.73]***  [7.80]*** 
-2.464  -2.095  -2.272  -1.924  Industry-induced stock 
return in year t-1  [7.10]***  [5.64]***  [6.61]***  [5.22]*** 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       49 
Table 14 
Stock price reactions around forced CEO turnovers 
This  table  reports  3-  and  5-day  market-adjusted  announcement  returns  around  forced  CEO 
turnover  announcements.  Average  announcement  returns  are  calculated  separately  for 
observations with positive and negative firm-specific stock returns preceding the CEO turnover, 
and observations with equal-weighted industry stock returns above and below the mean industry 
stock return in the sample. Firm-specific stock returns are calculated as the residuals from OLS 
regressions of annual firm returns on equal-weighted industry stock returns (shown in column 1 
of Table 2). The industry definitions follow the Fama and French (1997) classification into 48 
industries. 
                       
Panel A: 3-day stock price reaction around announcements of forced CEO turnovers   
  
Below-average industry 
performance    
Above-average industry 















Positive idiosyncratic stock 
return in year t-1 
(outperformer) 
36  -3.46%    20  -3.62%    0.07 
Negative idiosyncratic stock 
return in year t-1 
(underperformer) 
198  -1.18%    112  -1.70%    0.35 
T-test for differences in 
means     1.21        1.00 
     
 
                       
Panel B: 5-day stock price reaction around announcements of forced CEO turnovers 
  
Below-average industry 
performance    
Above-average industry 















Positive idiosyncratic stock 
return in year t-1 
(outperformer) 
36  -3.03%    20  -4.68%    0.58 
Negative idiosyncratic stock 
return in year t-1 
(underperformer) 
198  -1.18%    112  -2.60%    0.87 
T-test for differences in 
means     0.93        0.80 
     
  
 
 